Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage by Jacobs, Michael S & Winter, Ralph K, Jr.
The Yale Law Journal
Volume 81, Number 1, November 1971
Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by
Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage
Michael S. Jacobs* and Ralph K. Winter, Jr." ' ,
I. Introduction
For years the impact of antitrust principles on the arrangements
allocating players among teams in professional sports has been hotly
disputed. Now recent events seem to have brought this issue to a
head. A malaise among 'good athletes like Curt Flood has increased
the tempo of litigation, and an important voice in the United States
Senate, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., has responded to a petition for an
antitrust exemption for the proposed basketball merger by calling for
a full scale legislative review of the issue. We enter this crowded arena,
not to solve the antitrust dilemma, but to put it to rest. For, in the form
in which it is generally debated, it is an issue whose time has come
and gone, an issue which has suffered that modem fate worse than
death: irrelevancy.
We are strongly of the view that the dispute over the impact of
antitrust on the allocation of players in professional sports has, by
focusing so intently upon merger and group boycott questions, gen-
erally overlooked what may be a dispositive consideration: national
labor policy. For while the antitrust issue has been debated in much
the same terms for more than a generation, the employment rela-
tionship in many professional sports has undergone a major change.
In professional football, basketball and baseball, the players are or-
ganized in unions which are recognized by, and bargain with, their
leagues. The establishment of collective bargaining, however, is not
simply a change in economic structure. It also entails a change in
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legal status which has been only dimly perceived. For now another
federal statute, the National Labor Relations Act, must be taken
into account in the debate over the legitimacy of the arrangements
allocating players among teams. We make no claim for this article
as an exhaustive study of the implications of labor policy for the
professional sports industry. Rather, we intend, by examining two
quite different, ongoing controversies-the Flood litigation and the
proposed basketball merger-merely to bring what we believe to be
the governing principles into focus and thus to illustrate the profound
impact of labor policy. First, however, we must describe the terms in
which these controversies have been traditionally debated.
Casual readers of the sports pages know of the tribulations of Curt
Flood, the sometime outfielder and expatriate resident of Copenhagen
and Barcelona. Flood, a good ballplayer, was traded in 1969 by the
St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies. Inspired in part by
an urge to resist treatment as a chattel (and perhaps also by W. C.
Fields' alleged epitaph"), Flood rebelled. In the face of organized
baseball's refusal to let him seek employment with teams other than
Philadelphia, he quit baseball for a time and, his contract having been
assigned by the Phillies to the Washington Senators, a subsequent
comeback attempt failed. He has now left the game forever.
Sportswriters need not fear diminished copy, however, for Curt
Flood is alive and well in the Supreme Court. Having deprived the
sport of his athletic skills, he turned to that other great American
pastime, litigation, and sought to strip the baseball club owners of
their cherished "reserve" system: a rule (or agreement between all the
clubs) that the baseball services of each player are in effect the per-
manent property, unless assigned, of the team holding the player's
contract. 2 Flood sued the Commissioner of Baseball and the individual
1. "I'd rather be dead than in Philadelphia."
2. The reserve "clause" is not one clause but is actually a system of provisions
contained in the Major League Rules and the Uniform Player's Contract. Rule 3(a)
of the Major League Rules requires every player to sign a Uniform Player's Contract
drafted by the Major League Executive Council. BASEBALL BLUE BooK 512 (1971). Section
10(a) of the Uniform Player's Contract provides that if a player does not sign a contract
by March 1 with the club that he played for during the past season, the club may
unilaterally renew his contract and cut his salary no more than twenty per cent. Any
renewal contract will contain another renewal provision. Section 6(a) provides that the
club may assign the player's contract to any other club in accordance with the Major
League Rules.
The alleged boycott sanctions are contained in other Major League Rules. Rule
3(g) forbids clubs to negotiate with a player reserved by another club. BASEBALL BLUE
BooK 513-14 (1971). Rule 15 provides that a player who fails to report to his club shall
be placed on a Restricted List, and that any player who violates his contract or reserva-
tion shall be placed on a Disqualified List. id. at 545.
Vol. 81: 1, 1971
Antitrust and Athletes
team owners, alleging, inter alia, that the reserve system and its boy-
cott sanctions-each owner agrees not to employ a player who refuses
to agree to the reserve clause-violates the Sherman Act.3 By way of
relief, he sought money damages and an injunction restraining the
defendants from agreeing to impose the reserve system on him. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected Flood's
claims and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, declining
to depart from precedents of the Supreme Court, affirmed that de-
cision. The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari.
4
Flood's action has received wide coverage in the media. It has not
been of interest only to sports fans, however, for it has also been
heralded as being of legal significance. First, it raises an interesting
question about the doctrine of stare decisis. The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, held that professional baseball was
not "interstate commerce" and not subject to the Sherman Act.0 More
recently, Toolson v. New York YankeesO reaffirmed baseball's judi-
cially created exemption from the antitrust laws. It is clear, however,
that Toolson is out of step with other decisions involving professional
sports and a prime candidate for overruling although there has been
reliance upon it and some might argue that the proper balance of au-
thority between the Court and Congress would be best maintained
by judicial inaction.
3. In addition to his federal antitrust claims, Flood asserted three other separate
causes of action in the district court. Two of those were state law claims against
eleven of twenty-four club defendants, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship. He alleged a violation of state antitrust law and a restraint of his common law
right to engage in "the free exercise of playing professional baseball in New York,
California, and the several states in which defendants stage baseball games .... " His
final cause of action asserted that the reserve system is a form of peonage and invol-
untary servitude in violation of the anti-peonage statutes and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). State law claims, w e
believe, are preempted by the governing principles of labor law described in the text
of this article. The peonage claim is disposed of at pp. 17-18 infra.
4. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afJ'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3135 (U.S. 1971) (No. 32, 1971 Term).
5. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
7. Later rulings on the scope of the commerce clause have made Mr. Justice
Holmes' assertion that baseball games are "purely state affairs," 259 U.S. at 208,
anachronistic. And a subsequent decision that professional football is subject to the
Sherman Act, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), has left his
observation that games are not "commerce" because "personal effort, not related to
production, is not a subject of commerce," 259 U.S. at 209, a glaring anomaly in the
law and left Toolsona ruling which applies only to professional baseball and to no
other professional sport. That, however, is a distinction without a basis in antitrust
policy and Toolson must be viewed as a departure from that policy. Indeed, the Court
has conceded that the distinction may seem "illogical," "unrealistic" or "inconsistent."
Id. at 452. Flood's action, therefore, seems to raise important questions about the impact
of the doctrine of stare decisis.
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Second, Flood seems important because the antitrust claims it makes
threaten to restructure the professional sports industry. To the extent
that professional football and basketball employ a reserve, option or
other restrictive system, Flood's action clearly threatens them. Football
employs a common draft which gives particular teams exclusive rights
to sign graduating seniors to the standard one year option contract.
A player can "play out his option" at a salary reduction of ten per cent
and thus become a "free agent." But if a different club signs him, it
must "compensate" his old team. If no agreement on compensation is
reached, the Commissioner of Football is empowered to award players
from the acquiring club to the other. This "mandatory compensation"
requirement clearly lessens the bargaining power of free agents. Pro-
fessional basketball, if Congress approves the proposed merger, also
intends to institute a common draft for college seniors and impose
a mandatory compensation provision to govern the signing of veteran
free agents who play out their contracts with their teams.
A ruling striking down the reserve clause would thus seem to en-
danger these arrangements, although explicit congressional sanction
of the football merger may leave a somewhat different legal situation in
that sport.8 Furthermore, cases in the lower courts involving basketball
indicate the law may be moving rapidly in the direction of invalidating
restrictions limiting competition for players. Robertson v. The National
Basketball Association9 strongly suggested the proposed basketball
merger is illegal because of its impact on the players and permitted
the players to challenge it. And Haywood v. Denver Rockets' o invali-
dated the National Basketball Association's four-year college rule,
which forbade the drafting of a high school player until his college
class was graduated and effectively excluded a large number of young
athletes from professional basketball. Despite the NBA's contention
that the rule should be tested by a reasonableness standard, the Court
decided that the rule was a group boycott and illegal per se. That
theory, however, if applied generally, would seem to invalidate all
concerted arrangements allocating players among teams.
Beyond the rapidly developing litigation front, the National Basket-
ball Association and American Basketball Association are seeking an
explicit congressional exemption for their proposed merger. Although
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). Approval of the merger may, or may not, be taken as
approval of the arrangements described in the text.
9. 1970 Trade Cas. 73,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
10. 1971 Trade Cas. 73,536 (D.C. Cal. 1971).
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there may be non-labor reasons for seeking a merger, both leagues
have indicated their belief that a merger is necessary to end the "bid-
ding war" for rookies by establishing a common draft and instituting
mandatory compensation arrangements to govern the signing of free
agents.1 Senator Ervin has called for a full scale review of the antitrust
issue and has sponsored legislation explicitly applying the Sherman
Act to professional sports.12 Although such legislation might affect
many practices in the industry, Senator Ervin has made it clear that
its principal impact would be to restrict the ability of the owners to
allocate players among teams through collusive means.
Looking at these issues strictly in antitrust terms, a horizontal merger
of all the "firms" in an industry or an agreement between them to
deal with others only on specified terms would raise serious antitrust
questions. While there may be some reason to treat a group of teams
-"a league"--as a "firm," there seems little reason to permit a
horizontal merger or cartel arrangement, i.e., group boycott, among
them all. Relatively evenly matched teams may increase fan inter-
est, and concerted action allocating players within "leagues" may
be essential to consumer satisfaction and the success of the overall
enterprise. Many thus attribute the lack of success of the football All-
American Conference to the fact that no other team could beat the
Cleveland Browns. Allocation of players in the interest of even contests
is thought by some to be an "efficiency," therefore, and no more a
violation of the antitrust laws than the formation of a law firm by
previously independent practitioners. In both cases, the concerted
action produces efficiencies which arguably outwveigh whatever re-
straints on competition are involved, and the presence of these effi-
ciencies is indicated in a shorthand way by calling each league what we
call law partnerships, a "firm."'13 A merger of these "firms" is harder
to justify, however, for there is less reason to think that competition
for players between leagues is inconsistent with evenly matched con-
tests within them or that there will not be a sufficient number of good
players in each league. Fan interest may be stimulated whether or not
11. See statements of Jack Dolph, Commissioner, American Basketball Asociation;
Walter Kennedy, Commissioner, National Basketball Association; and Thomas H. Kuchel,
before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly Legislation of the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nov. 15, 1971 (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
12. S. 2616, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). It provides in part that "the business of pro-
viding for profit public games or contests between any team of professional players shall
not be exempt from the [Sherman Act]."
13. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pts. I and 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (196M7).
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individual leagues are joined in financial wedlock. If that is the case,
the impact of a merger would be anti-competitive and antitrust prin-
ciples would seem to bar it.
Although these questions remain open, we see no reason to take
issue with Senator Ervin's general view that professional sports present
no special case for exemption from the antitrust laws and, putting
aside considerations relating to stare decisis, we would welcome the
overruling of Toolson. Notwithstanding this area of agreement, how-
ever, we take a radically different view of the merits of challenges
by players to reserve or option clauses. For us, the antitrust issue is
a straw man, deserving the space we devote to it only because so many
eminent persons, including some who have much to lose, mistake
straw for flesh and blood. Both the dispute over the basketball merger
and the debate over the merits of individual challenges to the reserve
clause have taken insufficient account of a recent development with
far reaching consequences. The terms and conditions of employment
of professional athletes in baseball, basketball and football are no
longer governed solely by individual contracts but have been sup-
planted in part by collective bargaining between the leagues and
player unions. As a result, national labor policy, rather than antitrust
law, is the principal and pre-eminent legal force shaping employment
relationships in professional sports.
The antitrust battle being waged in Congress and in the Supreme
Court by the leagues and their players is a case of the right teams
playing the wrong game in the wrong arena. Once a collective bar-
gaining relationship exists between professional athletes and their
leagues, Flood's lawsuit and legislative proposals of similar intent
constitute challenges not, as critics of the club owners charge, to a
system of peonage, but to two fundamental principles of collective
bargaining as it has developed in the United States: the exclusive
power of the bargaining agent and freedom of contract between em-
ployer and union. The "right" to exercise individual bargaining power
without restraint, which Flood claims, is explicitly denied to employees
with a bargaining representative validly recognized under the National
Labor Relations Act. Furthermore, the reserve clause in baseball and
the common draft in basketball raise questions, not of group boycott
or merger law, but of the scope of the duty to bargain and of freedom
of contract between parties to collective bargaining. To us, therefore,
the question is no longer whether professional sports are entitled to
a special exemption from the antitrust laws where their employment
relationships are involved, but whether unions of professional athletes
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are entitled to special help from the courts and Congress in bargaining
with their employers.
II. The Governing Principles of Labor Law
A. The Professional Athlete and His Bargaining Representative
At stake in the Flood litigation and the basketball merger is the
power of the clubowners to agree not to compete for the services of
individual players. Flood seeks to exercise his individual bargaining
power free of collusive arrangements by others. This is also the goal
of those players who oppose the basketball merger or petition Congress
for legislative help: to force individual teams (or leagues) to compete
for their services so that their individual bargaining power is increased.
This is an appealing claim, for it combines notions of individual lib-
erty with traditional views about rewarding the talented. This goal,
however, is of much greater importance to the stars than to the
journeymen, for the unique qualities of the former make for great
individual bargaining power.
However much legal merit such claims have in the absence of col-
lective bargaining, it is a first principle of the National Labor Relations
Act that employees in a bargaining unit lose their "right" to bargain
individually when a majority vote to be represented by a union. For
under Section 9 of that Act, the elected representative becomes the
exclusive representative' 4 for purposes of collective bargaining and
individuals seeking to exercise control over their employment destinies
must work through the union. To be sure, the concept of an exclusive
representative is not essential to collective bargaining. In some coun-
tries, collective bargaining systems do in fact operate on a members-
only basis, with unions representing only those workers who adhere
to the organization. Nevertheless, the concept is central to the institu-
tion as it has developed in the United States and to the legal structure
which supports it.
A full explanation for the adoption of the exclusive representative
system in this country-a fear of company unions, considerations of
efficiency in bargaining, etc.-is unnecessary, for there is an explana-
tion which speaks dirictly to the case of the talented athlete. As Mr.
Justice Brennan put it:
14. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
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National labor policy has been built on the premise that by
pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor or-
ganization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an
appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The pol-
icy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to
order his own relations with his employer .... 1
Forbidding the exercise of individual bargaining is thus a means of
strengthening the collectivity. It deprives employers of the divide and
conquer tactic of bargaining individually with their employees and
increases the bargaining power of the collectivity by including the
most talented employees in the group for which the bargain is made.
If the most skilled workers were able to opt out of the collectivity,
the employer would be under less compulsion to make generous set-
tlements with the union.
Because the exercise of individual bargaining power is extinguished,
it is a fact of industrial life that the talented individual may fare less
well in collective bargaining than he would if he bargained on his
own. One of the first things many industrial unions seek is the elimi-
nation of differentials paid for the "same work," the "same work" being
defined in terms of rough similarity of job rather than identical effi-
ciency in production."' Unions may also tend to narrow differentials
between skilled and unskilled jobs by bargaining for roughly the same
increases in absolute terms.17 Over time this diminishes relative differ-
entials and may be one reason why the question of craft severance is a
much litigated issue before the National Labor Relations Board.18
Where employers agree to hire only through union hiring halls, highly
skilled workers may be excluded from an entire industry because a
union fearful of unemployment may not admit them to the halls.1 0
Consider, finally, the typical seniority clause, which may dictate the
order of layoffs solely according to length of time employed in the
seniority unit. In each of these examples, productivity is likely to vary
15. NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
16. Where the union does not eliminate differentials, it generally establishes a fixed
range. L. REYNOLDS & C. TAFT, THE EVOLUTION OF WAGE STRUCTURE 171-72 (1956).
17. Id. at 185.
18. See National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948), overruled by American Potash
& Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954), overruled by Malinckrodt Chemical Works, 162
N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
19. A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 127-28 (1962). Workers may also be
admitted but consigned to work priority groups. LABOR-MANAGEMENT SER'VICES ADMINIS-
TRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ExcLusivE UNION WORK REFERRAL SYSTEMS IN TIlE BUILD.
NG TRADES 57 (1970).
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enormously among workers but the collective agreement does not per-
mit it to be taken into account. While each of these practices may well
be thought to be for the benefit of the majority, it cannot be doubted
that in many cases a more talented worker would fare better if he
were permitted to opt for individual bargaining. The National Labor
Relations Act, however, compels the individual sacrifice for the good
of the whole. As the Supreme Court was at pains to point out in J.L
Case v. NLRB:
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position
more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but
the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain,
individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in
as a contribution to the collective result. We cannot except indi-
vidual contracts generally from the operation of collective ones
because some may be more individually advantageous.
20
There is no reason whatsoever to think that unions of professional
athletes ought to be treated differently; indeed, the above seems par-
ticularly applicable to them. If the stars in a sport can opt out of the
bargaining unit, the remnant union, consisting entirely of journeymen,
will be weak indeed. It is far from clear that any substantial conces-
sions on salaries or pensions can be extracted by a union of marginal
players, if the stars are either individually or through another union
making their own deal. It is even doubtful whether a union of marginal
players can exist. The existence of unions in professional sports thus
negates any possibility of individual bargaining except as permitted
by the collective bargain. This is not to say that the stars in a sport
are worse off belonging to a union than they are bargaining individu-
ally with a cartel of their potential employers. But it is to say that
many, if not most, of the benefits-e.g., minimum salaries, travel al-
lowances-achieved by inclusion of the stars will largely benefit mar-
ginal players and, further, that the claims of individual "rights" made
by Flood to the courts and others to Congress are wholly and utterly
inconsistent with the existence of an exclusive bargaining representa-
tive. Peonage it may be, but it is a peonage imposed by national
labor policy.
Two important qualifications must be added, however. First, while
the concept of an exclusive bargaining representative forecloses indi-
vidual bargaining at the option of individual employees, it does not
20. 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
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foreclose the collective bargain from leaving certain issues to be re-
solved by individual bargaining.21 There is nothing in the National
Labor Relations Act which rules out arrangements of the type Flood
and the other players want. The Act merely dictates the process by
which they are to be reached. Second, the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative may not reach any agreement it pleases without regard to its
impact upon members of the bargaining unit. From the statutory grant
6f exclusive bargaining power has sprung a duty, in Steele v. Louisville
g: N. R.R.,22 to represent all members of the bargaining unit fairly.
Whether acquiescence in reserve or option clauses by a union of ath-
letes violates that duty turns in part on the peculiar nature of collective
bargaining by professional athletes, and so the question of fair repre-
sentation will be taken up after consideration of the role of the reserve
or option clauses in that bargaining.
2 3
B. Reserve or Option Clauses and Freedom of Contract
The reserve or option clause issue is central to the employment
relationship in professional sports. In the absence of collective bar-
gaining, such clauses are unilaterally imposed by an employer cartel.
After collective bargaining is introduced, however, they must be
viewed as an integral part of a bargain-perhaps a "bad" or "unfair"
bargain, but a bargain nevertheless. For this reason, the reserve clause
issue intersects with yet a second fundamental principle of collective
bargaining: freedom of contract.
We, as well as others, think it is obvious that reserve or option
clauses are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act.2 4 Under the Act, unions and employers are required
to bargain in good faith about "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment."2 5 This phrase has been given an expansive
reading by the Supreme Court and has been said to include, among
other more obvious subjects, pension plans, 20 contracting out of work,27
and elimination of jobs.28 We find it difficult to construct even a
hypothetical argument that a contractual provision so intimately con-
21. Id. at 338.
22. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
23. See pp. 18-21 infra.
24. It is our understanding that no party to the Flood litigation or responsible indi.
vidual in professional sports disputes this contention.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
26. Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
27. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
28. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago N.W. R.R., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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nected with determiniing the team for which an athlete will play and
what salary and other benefits he may extract through individual bar-
gaining is not a term and condition of employment. The reserve or
option clause is at the heart of the collective bargaining relationship
and ari issue which must be resolved if bargaining is to mature.
Whether maximum salaries, or only minimum, are to be specified by
the agreement and how, in the absence of maxima, individual salaries
are to be determined, is at stake. Furthermore, the amount of salary
which will be paid under individual bargains plainly affects all other
provisions of the collective agreement which impose monetary costs
on the dubs. Finally, the reserve or option clause problem raises other
questions, such as maintaining evenly matched teams. It is no over-
statement to say that at the present time these clauses are he bargain-
ing issue between club owners and player unions.
Because it is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the club owners
must discuss the issue in good faith when the players raise it.20 Free-
dom of contract, however, is the general rule. Decision after decision
of the Supreme Court,30 as well as the quite explicit language of the
National Labor Relations Act,31 make it unmistakably clear that no
obligation to make concessions or reach an agreement is imposed by
the Act and that collective bargaining is to be generally free of gov-
ernmental interference in the writing of substantive contract terms.
So long as a party discusses the issues in good faith and, in the words
of Judge Magruder, makes "some reasonable effort in some direction
to compose his differences" with the other party, the obligations im-
posed by the statute are fulfilled. 32 A party may, therefore, freely
insist that particular provisions be included in the collective agreement
and use all the economic force he can muster to enforce his demands.
This is so no matter how unfair or unreasonable the provisions may
seem to others or how little is offered in exchange for them.
This approach, a cornerstone of national labor policy, may well
seem overly to favor the strong over the weak. But it is based on sound
considerations which call for rejection of any attempts to bring about
government intervention in bargaining in professional sports. For
even if the strong are helped by government abstention, there is no
29. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
30. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) provides in part: "[The duty to bargain collectively]
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."'
32. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 1953) (emphasis in the
original), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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reason to think either that the proper way to redress the balance of
power is to rewrite individual collective agreements, or that courts
are the proper institution to do the rewriting. There are, in fact, a
wide range of alternative methods by which the power of employers
or unions can be increased or diminished,33 alternatives which respect
the affirmative reasons supporting non-intervention by the government
in the bargaining process.
One such affirmative reason is the sound belief that the parties
know what is best for them. 4 The fact that governmental intervention
in the substantive terms of a collective contract must be from a dis-
tance increases the danger of imposing terms which are in the long run
ill-suited to the peculiar circumstances of the bargaining relationship.
All our experience with collective bargaining suggests the difficulty
of generalizing about the desirability of various contract provisions
in different industries and even in different firms within a single
industry.35 This reason seems peculiarly apt in the case of professional
sports. Collective bargaining in sports is not the mature institution
it is in other industries, and however much dissatisfaction there may
be with restrictions like reserve or option clauses, there is virtually
no agreement even among their critics as to what ought to replace
them. To do there what government has declined to do in more
familiar industrial contexts seems the height of folly. The Supreme
Court has recently declined to impose simple checkoff agreements on
employers. 36 Should it now impose a solution to the most complicated
and controversial issue outstanding between professional sports and
player unions?
A second affirmative reason supporting freedom of contract, the
belief that free collective bargaining leads to industrial peace, 7 also
has force in the context of professional sports. Because the parties
are forced to explain their positions and discuss their differences,
mutual understanding is fostered and areas of possible compromise
exposed. By not intervening in the fashioning of substantive contract
terms, the government enhances the possibilities of compromise by
maximizing the number of quids and quos. Inteiventionists tend to
33. Restrictions on picketing, the right to strike, market-wide union organization, the
use of replacements, or lockouts, for example, all affect the balance of power between
employers and unions.
34. See H. WELLINGTON, LAIOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESs 49 et seq. (1968).
35. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389 (1950).
36. See note 30 supra.
37. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 34.
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forget that depriving a party of a particular bargaining demand nec-
essarily changes more than his stance on that one issue. A strong
negotiating position will remain strong even if the government outlaws
a particular demand, because bargaining power can be shifted to
other issues. Denying a demand to a party may thus increase the
chances of a strike because it lessens the area of possible compromise
without affecting the underlying strength of the parties. If reserve
and option clauses are outlawed, the stance of the club owners on
minimum salaries, pensions, playing surfaces, schedules, arbitration
of grievances, etc., must be affected. Compromises on these other
issues may in turn be impeded and strikes encouraged. For though the
elimination of the reserve clause will help one faction in the union, the
response of the owners on other issues may injure a different faction.
This is so even if the owners cannot fully recoup what they would
lose if the reserve clause were outlawed. It may well be that denying
access to such provisions will increase their total wage bill because
there is no compensating concession to be extracted from the players'
union. Nevertheless, the owners will seek to recoup what they can and
the demands they make to that end may be more disruptive and in-
flammatory than the reserve clause itself.
In any event, there are many other kinds of contract provisions which
would limit the amounts stars can extract through individual bargain-
ing. We see no reason why the club owners cannot demand a maxi-
mum salary provision, for example. The probability of strikes may be
enhanced by legal intervention which forces the owners to turn to such
alternative proposals which many players-including the stars-will
find less palatable in the long run than the reserve clause.
Although this is not a brief for reserve or option clauses nor a pre-
diction that outlawing such clauses will cause strikes, it is very much
a brief for the position that if professional athletes are to have the right
to eng-age in collective bargaining and to strike, then the normal prin-
ciples of labor law should apply. It may well be that the long history
of collusive behavior enforcing the reserve clause in baseball calls for
a close look at the seriousness of the owners' bargaining over this issue.
But that is not to say that concessions are obligatory or that any action
other than an unfair labor practice proceeding is appropriate. Long
history or no, the club owners are now legally obligated to bargain
collectively over all terms and conditions of employment and the players
have the right to strike. The Toolson error in not applying the Sherman
Act will not be corrected by an error in not applying the Taft-Hartley
Act.
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1. The Baseball Hang-Up Provision and the Flood Case
While conceding that principles of labor law ought to be applicable
to the sports industry generally, some may argue that the present status
of the reserve clause in baseball's collective agreements requires that
principles of labor law not be applied in Flood. After Flood initiated
his action, the clubowners ceased to bargain about the reserve system
with the players' union. In response, the union refused to incorporate
any direct reference to it in the agreement. In order, however, to nego-
tiate on those matters on which agreement could be reached, the
parties adopted a "hang-up" provision which stipulated that neither
party would be required to bargain over the reserve system until the
Flood suit was terminated. The 1970 agreement did not, therefore, in-
corporate the reserve system although the system continued to govern
the relations of the parties.
A question thus arises as to whether the above-mentioned principles
of labor law apply when the parties have left the reserve system in a
legal, if not practical, limbo as far as the collective agreement is con-
cerned. Of course they do, for the whole import of what we have argued
is that collective bargaining is the prescribed, exclusive method of set-
tling such issues under the National Labor Relations Act once an
exclusive bargaining agent has been legally recognized. To be sure, if
the reserve clause is prohibited by the antitrust laws in spite of the
labor laws (a question to which we later turn), the courts must act,
but that is not to say a union and employer may agree to disagree and
have the courts rule on the legality of a disputed issue as though there
were no federally regulated bargaining relationship. If the establish-
ment of collective bargaining extinguishes antitrust claims, no stipula-
tion of the parties to cease bargaining about an issue can make it a
justiciable antitrust problem. If the claims survive, on the other hand,
no agreement of the parties can extinguish them. If the situation were
otherwise, we would not only witness the courts unconstitutionally
deciding what are essentially hypothetical cases-as well as rendering
decisions on the merits which can be overridden at any time by a
collective agreement-but collective bargaining would be complicated
by yet another issue to be negotiated: whether to leave disputed issues
to the courts.
2. The Basketball Common Draft and Merger
The application of labor law principles to the proposed common
draft in basketball raises somewhat different problems. Each league
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presently bargains with a union representing its players. There are,
therefore, separate bargaining units and questions arise as to the re-
lationship of labor law to the proposed common draft. May the
leagues bargain individually with the two player associations for a
common draft even if the leagues maintain their separate identities,
or is a merger necessary? May a union and employer agree upon the
method by which persons outside the bargaining unit, e.g., graduating
college seniors, can enter it?
A strong case can be made for the proposition that the leagues may
retain their separate entities and bargain with the players' unions for
a common draft. Although it is a refusal to bargain for an employer
to insist that competing units be organized before he will bargain
with a union representing his employees,38 it does not follow that the
employer may not bargain with one union for contract provisions
affecting others. Bargaining need not be stayed pending organization
of all competing units since an employer is free to point out and
insist that he cannot afford increased costs because of competition from
unorganized employers-or employers organized by a different union
for that matter. The parties may, in short-indeed, must, if they are
to bargain rationally-take competing units into account in bargaining.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB30 the Supreme Court
rejected an employer's argument that he might refuse to bargain about
the "contracting out" of work from a bargaining unit. Because of
the intimate relationship between the contracting out and the terms
and conditions of employment in the original unit, the Court held
that it was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The fact that bargaining
over the subject directly affected a group of employees outside the
unit was not a sufficient reason for the employer to act unilaterally.
Indeed, the very fact that the two bargaining units were in direct
competition for the same work was critical to the decision.4 0
But for the fact that the employees benefit and the employers suffer
from the competition, rather than the other way around, the common
draft proposal seems to raise the precise question answered in Fibre-
board. The method by which players are allocated between bargaining
units bears an extremely close relationship to the terms and conditions
38. See, e.g., American Barge Lines, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 139, 147 (1939).
39. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
40. Id. at 213-14. To be sure, a union and an employer may not agree that the
union impose certain terms and conditions of employment upon other units with a view
to, driving these other units out of the product market. UMW v. Pennington, 881 U.S.
657 (1965). See pp. 25-26 infra.
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of employment in those units (common draft case), just as the method
by which work is allocated between units bears an extremely close
relationship to the terms and conditions of employment in the original
unit (contracting out). The difference is only that two employers
are in direct competition for the same athletic services rather than
two groups of employees being in competition for the same work. Be-
cause collective agreements in sports provide only for minimum salaries
and call for individual bargaining, negotiations over provisions allocat-
ing players seem a natural and logical step, as suitable for collective
bargaining as contracting out in the industrial context. Both the policy
of letting the parties work out their own arrangements and of maxi-
mizing the possible quids and quos so as to encourage compromise
lead to this result.41
It should be emphasized that even if the common draft is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, the governing principles are still
principles of labor law. For example, the players may argue that
insistence on a common draft is more analogous to refusing to bargain
until competing units are organized than it is to the Fibreboard de-
cision. If so, it would be a refusal to bargain by the club owners for
which the National Labor Relations Act provides a remedy.42
A final issue needs to be mentioned. A player draft controls not
only those in the bargaining unit but the method by which those
outside enter it. Some may argue that such an issue is not subject to
resolution by collective bargaining. We submit that it is and that
many precedents in the industrial context support this conclusion.
The method by which new players enter has an enormous effect on
those already in the unit and the collective agreement which governs
them. Revenues spent on new entrants are not available for uses the
union might prefer. Employers in industry must bargain about sub-
contracting, or at least its effect on the unit, and this is bargaining
over the extent to which persons outside the unit will do the work
of the unit and reduce revenues available to those in it. Exclusive
hiring hall agreements in effect require those seeking employment to
gain entry into the union hiring hall before gaining employment. And,
last but not least, almost all wage agreements stipulate the wage at
which new entrants must come into the unit.
41. See pp. 12-13 supra.
42. See NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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III. The Legality of Reserve or Option Clauses
The reserve clause (and, a fortiori, the option clause) thus seems on
its face a contractual arrangement sanctioned by collective bargaining.
The protection conferred by the exclusive powers of the bargaining
representative and the policy of freedom of contract, however, do
not extend to provisions which violate either the fiduciary responsi-
bilities of the bargaining agent or some other established policy. Three
potential lines of attack seem worthy of discussion: policies against
unreasonable employment contracts, the duty of fair representation,
and the antitrust laws.
A. The Reserve Clause as an Unreasonable Employment Contract
We turn first to the question of whether, apart from the collusive
means, i.e. group boycott, by which they are imposed on the players,
reserve or option clauses-either in the form of perpetual "ownership"
of athletic services or of a mandatory compensation requirement when
a free agent signs with another team-are such that they violate
public policies looking to relieve individuals of unreasonable re-
straints on their freedom to seek employment. This issue sometimes
appears as a restraint of trade issue and some such notion underlies
Flood's claim that the reserve clause constitutes peonage as a matter
of law. It might also be analogized to covenants not to compete which,
when imposed on employees, have been held illegal unless reasonable
in time, activity and area.4 3
First, our strong impression is that the center of gravity of the criti-
cism of reserve or option clauses is not so much the dislike of long-term
contracts as the desire to get more in return for them. Furthermore,
such restraints are not uncommon to collective bargaining. Where
employers agree to hire only through union hiring halls, the employee
must as a practical matter go to the employer to which he is assigned
by the union. It is well-known that the hiring hall is a device which
permits unions to exclude laige numbers of persons from employment
in entire industries. One cannot expect, for -instance, to move to a
new city and be admitted to the union hiring hall of his trade, even
though he has for a lifetime been a member of the international union.
Once again, if there are policies lurking around which invalidate the
reserve clause, they are also policies which cut a wide swath through
collective bargaining as we know it.
43. See 5 S. WILLUTON, CoNTMCcS § 1643 (2d ed. 1937).
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But most important, the reserve or option clause, where a collective
bargaining relationship exists, is not analogous to unlimited covenants
not to compete. The reserve clause-the most restrictive in sports
-is not, as a legal matter, a firm long-term restriction. If the clause
is in the individual player agreement, it can be superseded at any
time by a collective agreement. And because it is a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining, the club owners are required by law to discuss
the players' proposals on the issue at the expiraiion of every collective
agreement, the players being free to strike to enforce their demands.
In short, whether contained in the league rules, individual player
contracts or in the collective agreement, for all practical purposes the
reserve clause expires with the collective agreement.
B. The Reserve Clause and The Duty of Fair Representation
In describing the duty of fair representation, the Supreme Court
has said:
Under this [Steele] doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory au-
thority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a
statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without
hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion
with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct.44
Quite obviously, this duty does not compel a union to press for the
individual objectives of each of its members or, when the interests
of various groups within the unit conflict, to eschew choice among
them. Nor does it prevent the establishment of arbitrary rules, where
the arbitrariness is arguably in aid of a valid goal of the majority, e.g.,
limiting the discretion of an employer. What it does is prohibit dis-
crimination unrelated to industrial (or athletic) considerations. The
classic case of unfair representation is denying the benefits of bar-
gaining to, or using bargaining power to injure, a group because of
its race. Presumably, distinctions based 'Solely on political affiliation,
ethnic background, sex, or the personal spite of the union establish-
ment would also be condemned. But the law has been tolerant of
contractual arrangements which, in the face of conflicting interests
within the union, benefit one group of workers at the expense of
others. In Britt v. Trailmobile Co..,45 for example, the employer and
44. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
45. 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
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union were faced with the problem of adding to the seniority list the
employees of a recently acquired firm. By agreement, seniority was
said to start from the first day in the plant, a solution which put all
the employees of the acquired firm at the bottom of the list. The
agreement was upheld. One might well quarrel with this decision on
the grounds that it seems a small intrusion on the bargaining process
to compel a dovetailing of the two lists (date of hire with either firm)
rather than permitting the majority completely to disregard the inter-
ests of the minority. There were, moreover, no other interests at stake
since industrial efficiency would not have been affected by imposing
what seems the fairer alternative. The employer would seem equally
amenable to either solution.
This, we submit, overlooks the complexities of the matter. A goal of
unionism is to restrict the discretion of the employer. One way of
accomplishing this is to impose fixed rules of relatively easy appli-
cation. Such rules are of necessity arbitrary because their very purpose
is to limit drastically the range of considerations the employer may
take into account. The larger the range of considerations which may
permissibly enter into any decision calculus, the more discretion is left
to the decision maker, thus diminishing the control that can be ex-
ercised over him. The bilateral control contemplated by collective
bargaining requires that many decisions be subject to some form of
negotiated control by the union. Direct union participation in every
decision would accomplish this, but that is usually impractical because
it is wildly inefficient and, unless the union has such complete control
over the decision that no one dare challenge it-the hiring hall comes
to mind-continual participation is an invitation to civil war and chaos
within the union. The other, and more common, alternative is the
fixed, arbitrary rule, like the seniority clause.
In turn, however, this need for arbitrariness drastically limits the
extent to which a tribunal can intervene in the name of fair repre-
sentation, in the absence of what is virtually a gtatuitously discrimina-
tory use of bargaining power. Again consider seniority. Although its
familiarity leads us to take it for granted, it is both arbitrary and
discriminatory. Length of time within the seniority unit has no neces-
sary connection with experience, efficiency or anything else. Seniority
has become commonplace because it is handy and simple. More im-
portant, it is politically palatable within the union because it dis-
criminates in favor of the majority, those who have been on the job
for some time, and against the minority, new or future hires. If we
agree that seniority arrangements are nevertheless permissible, then
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the use of senioiity in Trailmobile ought to be regarded more as an
act of poor sportsmanship than a violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. Some employees were going to lose seniority no matter what
arrangement was chosen, and there is no "fair" solution in terms of
arfy discernible norm *or pre-existing standard. Dovetailing, after all,
usually will arbitrarily give an advantage to the employees of the
older firm. What seems wrong with the solution chosen was that the
politically powerless were made to bear the entire loss. However, all
seniority clauses bear most heavily on the powerless, such as new or
future hires, and to reject the Trailmobile solution would involve
the courts not in the fashioning of fair settlements but in rejecting
the union's political processes and bargaining as the proper procedure
to settle the issue. Such a ruling would thus come close to a rejection
of collective bargaining itself.
We take this excursion not because we believe reserve or option
clauses to be fully analogous to seniority, but because we believe this
everyday example illuminates the scope of the duty of fair representa-
tion. Moreover, we believe the reserve clause to be an a fortiori case in
light of it. The shape of the typical seniority clause is often irrelevant
to the employer and resolved simply by a test of strength within the
union. The reserve clause, or some kind of restriction on the move-
ment of players from team to team, on the other hand, is believed by
many to be essential to the economic health of the sport. A fortiori,
therefore, it seems more justifiable than the typical seniority provision.
Few, even among those most opposed to the reserve clause, would
contend that all long-term contracts ought to be illegal in sports. What
many seek is a middle ground, in some cases a middle ground not far
from the clause itself. What is the best solution, however, is not the
issue under the duty of fair representation; that is left to collective
bargaining. The issue is whether invidious discrimination is present.
But consider baseball. Among the matters governed by collective
agreements are maximum salary cuts, travel expenses, minimum sal-
aries, provisions for health care, and pensions. There are, however, no
provisions establishing maximum salaries. It is hardly surprising that
the club owners insist on some provision regulating the allocation of
players among clubs, some provision to introduce some certainty as
to how much value in player talent each club owns and how much in
salary may be extracted by the more talented ballplayers. To be sure,
the reserve clause in precise terms is not the only possible arrangement,
but for purposes of testing its validity under the duty of fair repre-
sentation, it is enough to say that all alternative arrangements will also
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discriminate against the more talented players. Indeed, many of these
alternatives seem even less favorable to the better athletes than the
reserve clause. If minimum salaries can be negotiated, so too can
maximum salaries. But if maximum salaries are held to be illegal in
baseball because they discriminate against the best players, then they
should also be illegal in the steel industry because they discriminate
against the best steelworkers. It is elitist to view industrial workers
as fungible and to treat them as though there are no differences in
efficiency. Collective arrangements there can be as discriminatory as
in sports, for it is in the nature of collective bargaining that the most
productive members of the union may get less for the sake of the
collectivity.
C. The Reserve Clause and the Antitrust Laws
Flood's allegations fit a classic antitrust mould. All the buyers to
whom he can sell his services have agreed not to purchase these serv-
ices except' on certain terms. If the efficiencies produced by the ar-
rangement (stability of terms, evenly matched contests, and so on)
do not outweigh the restrictive effects, such an agreement would
plainly be labeled a cartel or price fix, a per se violation of the anti-
trust laws.4
6
There is, however, no reason to think that as between employers
and employees engaged in collective bargaining the antitrust laws
either have or ought to have any application whatsoever to the de-
termination of terms and conditions of employment. When the players'
unions submit demands to the club owners, the players are themselves
engaged in collusive conduct (all the sellers agree not to sell their
services except.. .), albeit collusion fostered by law.47 Similarly, when
a group of employers compelled by law to bargain with a union confer
together and submit identical proposals, their conduct seems such that
46. The assertion that cartels or price fixes are per se illegal is deceptively clear-cut.
for the question of what is a cartel or price fix is essentially judgmental. There are all
kinds of commonplace economic arrangements which fix prices and divide markets, and
yet are legal, for example, law partnerships. Without going into detail, the rule may
be better stated as a per se prohibition on agreements which do not produce net effi-
ciencies, which is to say that once the restrictive effect is shown to outweigh the ef-
ficiencies, a court will not inquire into the reasonableness of the restriction, for example.
whether the price fixed is a reasonable one.
47. A union is a horizontal agreement between competitors to fix the prices (wages)
at which they will work. It is not fashionable to call unions cartels, because the term
is thought to be derogatory. But if the term is to have any analytic content, it must
encompass labor unions, for their express purpose is to eliminate competition among
particular workers.
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only the existence of collective bargaining protects them from an anti-
trust challenge.
48
Collective bargaining seeks to order labor markets through a system
of countervailing power.49 Thus it is often referred to by economists
as bilateral monopoly.50 If such a structure is to be protected by law,
then logically the antitrust claims between employers and employees
must be extinguished.
It is commonplace for employers to bargain as a group rather than
singly and the Supreme Court has explicitly declared multi-employer
bargaining to be authorized by the National Labor Relations Act.51
This makes a shambles of Flood's claims that the reserve clause is
imposed by anti-competitive means. What differentiates the reserve
clause from other contractual arrangements is the fact that the alter-
natives which competitors might offer are foreclosed by collusion. But
the collusion-joint employer proposals-is part and parcel of collec-
tive bargaining in the United States. Flood's arguments, if accepted,
would have absurd practical effects. For example, when the steel firms
make a joint wage offer to the United Steelworkers, an employee dis-
satisfied with the offer might, if the claims pressed in Flood are right,
sue the companies for engaging in a price fix.
Such results are unthinkable unless collective bargaining is to be
radically restructured. To bring about such results through Flood,
however, would border on the irresponsible. It has been litigated with
the implications for the institution of collective bargaining only dimly
perceived. The labor law issues have been in the corners of the case-
the courts below, for example, did not reach them-moving in and
out of the.shadows like an uninvited guest at a party whom one can't
decide either to embrace or expel. Many unionized industries-per-
haps all-would be affected by a sweeping decision, but those affected
are totally unaware that important issues of labor law are before the
Court.
An examination of the modern decisions of the Supreme Court on
the labor antitrust question, moreover, reveals not the slightest hint
that such a momentous decision-permitting individual members of
a bargaining unit to sue employers because they have jointly made an
48. Cf. NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
49. J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 137 et seq. (1952).
50. A. ARTrER, THEoRY OF VAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 80-81 (1959); G. STwLoH, TnE
THEORY OF PRicE 207-08 (3d ed. 1966).
51. NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
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offer-lurks somewhere in the Sherman Act.52 In 1941, the decision
in United States v. Hutcheson,r3 by holding that union conduct is gen-
erally immune from antitrust sanctions, brought to an end an era in
which the Sherman Act was a powerful restraint on union power.
Since then, three major decisions have attempted to fashion a theory
defining the scope of the immunity for collective bargaining activities
more precisely, a theory which, we believe, plainly immunizes reserve
or option clauses from suits by players.
In Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEIV,54 the union, having juris-
diction only over metropolitan New York City, organized the em-
ployees of most of the electrical equipment manufacturers and con-
tractors in the area. Under the collective agreements, the contractors
agreed to buy electrical equipment only from manufacturers in
contractual relations with Local 3, i.e., only those in New York City,
while the manufacturers agreed to sell only to those area contractors
who employed members of Local 3. Non-union operations were pre-
vented by the usual tactics of picketing and the like. Sheltered from
competition, the parties to this arrangement prospered.
Some excluded manufacturers brought an antitrust action against
Local 3. "Quite obviously," said the. Court through Mr. Justice Black,
"this combination of businessmen [the New York electrical manufac-
turers and contractors] has violated... the Sherman Act, unless its con-
duct is immunized by the participation of the union." ' 5 He concluded:
There is, however, one line which we can draw with assurance
that we follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress
feared the concentrated power of business organizations to domi-
nate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business monopo-
lies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union partici-
pates, and such participation is a violation of the Act. i
Unions violate the Sherman Act, therefore, when they "aid non-labor
groups to create business monopolies,"' i and "the same labor union
activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, depend-
ent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups." s
52. For a review of the labor-antitrust issue in the Supreme Court, see Winter. Col.
lective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union
Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
53. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
54. 325"U.S. 797 (1945).
55. Id. at 800.
56. Id. at 811.
57. Id. at 808.
58. Id. at 810.
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In Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 0 multi-employer,
multi-union negotiations led to an agreement containing the following
restriction on the operating hours of food store meat departments:
Market operating hours shall be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday
through Saturday, inclusive. No customer shall be served who
comes into the market before or after the hours set forth above. 00
Jewel Tea had objected to the provision throughout the negotiations
but, under the duress of a strike vote by the union, it signed. It then
brought suit against the union under the Sherman Act. Jewel Tea
argued that the provision in question was an attempt by its competi-
tors to prevent the night time, pre-packaged, self-service meat vending
for which it was equipped. The Court, in opinions by Justices White
and Goldberg, three Justices dissenting, upheld the union's contention
that the agreement was immune from antitrust sanctions.
Justice White ruled that the proper test of antitrust immunity was
to balance the labor policies at stake in the collective agreement against
the antitrust policies threatened by the specific provision. Important
in Justice White's calculus was the fact that the marketing hours
provision was a subject "well within the realm of 'wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment' about which employers
and unions must bargain,"' l and that the provision was of "immediate
and direct" 62 concern to union members. He concluded:
If it were true that self-service markets could actually operate
without butchers, at least for a few hours after 6 p.m., that no
encroachment on butchers' work would result and that the work-
load of butchers during normal working hours would not be
substantially increased, Jewel's position would have considerable
merit. For then the obvious restraint on the product market-
the exclusion of self-service stores from the evening market for
meat-would stand alone, unmitigated and unjustified by the
vital interests of the union butchers . . . . In such event the
limitation imposed by the unions might well be reduced to noth-
ing but an effort by the unions to protect one group of employers
from competition by another, which is conduct that is not exempt
from the Sherman Act ....
Thus the dispute between Jewel and the unions essentially
concerns a narrow factual question: Are night operations without
butchers, and without infringement of butchers' interests, feasible?
59. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
60. Id. at 679-80.
61. Id. at 691.
62. Id.
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The District Court resolved this factual dispute in favor of the
unions.
G3
Mr. Justice Goldberg fashioned a far different test. Since negotiating
parties are under a legal duty to bargain about mandatory subjects
of bargaining (the provision in question being such a subject), he
argued, all such subjects should be exempt from the antitrust laws.
After a detailed review of judicial efforts to apply the Sherman Act
to labor and of the legislative history of the NLRA, Justice Goldberg
concluded that
[t]he National Labor Relations Act . . . declares it to be the
policy of the United States to promote the establishment of wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment by free
collective bargaining between employers and unions. The Act
further provides that both employers and unions must bargain
about such mandatory subjects of bargaining. This national
scheme would be virtually destroyed by the imposition of Slier-
man Act criminal and civil penalties upon employers and unions
engaged in such collective bargaining. To tell tie parties that they
must bargain about a point but may be subject to antitrust penal-
ties if they reach an agreement is to stultify the congressional
scheme.64
Three Justices, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented on
the grounds that the case clearly fell within the Allen-Bradley rule6 5
Finally, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington," the Court con-
sidered allegations that the Mine Workers had agreed with the larger
companies in the industry upon a scheme to end "overproduction."
Their goal was to eliminate the smaller companies by encouraging
mechanization in the large mines and increasing wages along with
productivity. The increased wages, however, were to be imposed upon
all firms in the industry, whether mechanized or not, with the result
that the smaller, marginal companies would go out of business. Mr.
Justice White's opinion, concurred in by three Justices, said that such
allegations, if proved, would show a violation of the Sherman Act
on the grounds that
[o]ne group of employers may not conspire to eliminate com-
petitors from the industry and the union is liable with the em-
ployers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. This is true even
63. Id. at 692-94.
64. Id. at 711-12.
65. Id. at 735-38.
66. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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though the union's part in the scheme is an undertaking to secure
the same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from
the remaining employers .... 07
The Justices who dissented in Jewel Tea concurred, again on the
grounds that the case fell squarely within Allen-Bradley.(8 Mr. Justice
Goldberg dissented, arguing once more that mandatory subjects of
bargaining, when agreed upon by the parties, cannot give rise to
antitrust sanctions. He contended that "[i]f a union and employer are
prevented from discussing and agreeing upon issues which are, in the
great majority of cases, at the central core of bargaining, unilateral
force will inevitably be substituted for rational discussion and agree-
ment." 69
Each of these cases involved the antitrust liability, or labor law
exemption, of employers as well as unions for activities engaged in
as a result of collective bargaining. Yet not one opinion of a single
Justice contained even a hint of encouragement for the kind of claim
pressed in Flood. Quite the contrary, under every theory adumbrated,
that claim must be rejected. From Allen-Bradley to Pennington, the
majority of the Court has insisted that one factor be present before the
Sherman Act applies to arrangements arrived at through collective
bargaining: one group of employers must conspire to use the union
to hurt their competitors. The line the Court has consistently sought
to draw, therefore, is the line between the product market and the
labor market. Thus it was that Justice White's inquiry in Jewel Tea
focused on whether the matter in question was a mandatory subject of
bargaining and of importance to the union, and was not simply a
device Jewel's competitors might employ to weaken its competitive
position in the product market. Once it was determined that the
marketing hours provision affected working hours as well, the inquiry
was at a close. And in Pennington, antitrust liability was explicitly
bottomed on union involvement in an employer conspiracy to drive
competitors from the product market. Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent
declined to go even this far and took the flat position that all manda-
tory subjects of bargaining are exempt from antitrust liability, no
matter what their impact on the product market. We emphasize this,
not because the Justice is now counsel for Flood, but to demonstrate
that there has not been the slightest suggestion by anyone on the Court
67. Id. at 665-66.
68. Id. at 672.
69. Id. at 714.
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that the antitrust laws have the sweeping effect on collective bargain-
ing urged by Flood. Quite the contrary, the issue has been whether
even to go so far as to impose antitrust sanctions for the kind of
product market activities involved in Pennington.
That the reserve clause, as raised in Flood, is strictly a labor market
issue seems plain, and, as a result, cannot give rise to antitrust liability.
Surely a union butcher who desired to work at night could not chal-
lenge the contractual provision agreed upon in Jewel Tea. Upholding
such a challenge would effectively destroy collective bargaining by
undermining the authority of the bargaining representative and would
involve the courts in rewriting potentially every collective agreement
in the country at the behest of individual employees. Nor is a different
result called for when the union opposes the employer proposals. For
then the gist of the antitrust theory is little more than that hard
bargaining by employers with unions violates the Sherman Act, a claim
that can be pressed against wage proposals thought to be too "low,"
as well asthe reserve clause.
The reasoning above also supports the conclusion that the players
have no standing to pursue an antitrust suit against the basketball
merger. The merger may well be illegal because of its impact in other
markets but the players have no stake, other than as private citizens,
in that impact. Whatever injury they suffer is in the labor market and
we submit that their remedy, if any, lies in the labor laws.70
This discussion has relevance to the issues before Congress as well
as to the issues before the Court in Flood. Senator Ervin has intro-
duced legislation explicitly subjecting professional sports to the anti-
trust laws. We have no quarrel with such legislation in its literal form.
Our argument above is that the reserve or option clause is not prop-
erly an antitrust issue when raised by a player in a unit with an ex-
clusive collective bargaining representative. Our fear is merely that
the legislative history will suggest that the pending legislation is an
invitation by Congress to the courts to intervene at large in collective
bargaining relationships, in which case it will wreak havoc with the
labor laws. This fear, however, is no justification for abandoning the
proposed legislation, for there may well be practices in professional
sports which are not immunized by labor policy and which ought to
be made to pass antitrust muster.
To take a non-random illustration, the reserve clause may, in other
70. Such a remedy might be an unfair labor practice charge that the leagues refused
to discuss the impact of a merger on terms and conditions of employment. Another
remedy, of course, is the strike.
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circumstances, violate the antitrust laws. We have noted that reserve
or option clauses are not serious antitrust issues when raised by
members of a bargaining unit. Players are not, however, the only
potential plaintiffs. For example, imagine a club owner who is dis-
satisfied with the restrictions imposed on him by a reserve clause
system of player allocation and wants to "steal" players from the other
teams. He might well make the claim that the clause, even if in a
collective agreement, was a tactic of his "competitors" designed to
prevent him from putting together as good a team as he could, just
as the plaintiff in Jewel Tea claimed the marketing hours restriction
was designed to limit his ability to compete. To be sure, this claim
might not succeed. If only one league were involved, a court might
well decide that the league, rather than the individual teams, was the
"firm," on the grounds that consumer satisfaction required relatively
evenly matched contests and centralized control. Or it might conclude,
as Mr. Justice White seems to have done in Jewel Tea, that the clause
was not in fact designed to restrain product competition. A stronger
argument might be made by a newly-formed league that a collective
agreement between an established league and players' union which, for
example, permitted suits for injunction against players who attempted
to "jump" leagues, was designed to prevent the new league from
gaining access to the best players and to consign it permanently to
second class status. This claim is similar to the one which succeeded
in Allen-Bradley: a union-employer combination to exclude entry by
newcomers. Such cases seem paradoxical, for they challenge the very
same economic transactions the players are disputing. Nevertheless,
they seek to embrace the theory of Allen-Bradley and its progeny and
do not entail the frontal assault on national labor policy threatened
by Flood. Limiting antitrust claims to product competitors who have
suffered direct and actual injury endangers far fewer collective agree-
ments than permitting suits by individual employees, for in the latter
case virtually every agreement could be challenged. We express no
opinion on the merits of claims by rival leagues or maverick owners.
We do, however, think they illustrate the need to look further into
the impact of the labor laws on professional sports.
IV. Conclusion
The reserve and option clause issue is, therefore, miscast as an
antitrust problem in those sports where players' unions are recognized
-at least when the players bring the challenge. Indeed, one of the
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reasons this simmering question now boils is the growth of unions
which can carry on the litigation and lobbying necessary to a systematic
attack on the system. Their very existence seems to us, however, to
entail a radical change in the legal status of the reserve clause, for if
professional athletes are to engage in collective bargaining and have
the right to strike, the usual principles of labor law should apply.
We conclude that certiorari was improvidently granted in Flood
and the Court should so rule. In opposing Flood's petition for certi-
orari the defendants did not bring the labor issues to the Court's
attention, a failure which lent an undeserved aura of importance to
Toolson. Although the problems of stare decisis raised are interesting,
Toolson is no longer the critical barrier to Flood's challenge; the
defendants have an absolute defense on the merits, grounded in labor
law. Nor should the Court overrule Toolson and remand the remain-
ing questions. It is fruitless to remand what are frivolous claims,
particularly when they will be used as a bargaining lever in the very
process they seek to undermine: collective bargaining.
The existence of players' unions does not, however, foreclose Con-
gress from writing legislation explicitly outlawing the reserve clause
and its variants. We oppose such legislation, not because we like the
clause but for two quite different reasons. First, there is not a shred
of justification for outlawing the reserve system and leaving the
players with the right to strike. If government is to intervene, it should
do so as a substitute for, rather than a supplement to, collective bar-
gaining-which is to say professional athletes should not be covered
by the National Labor Relations Act and should not have the right
to strike.
Second, the reasons for disliking the clause are reasons for disliking
many aspects of collective bargaining. If reform is to be undertaken,
it should be generalized. For example, Senator Ervin has analogized
the basketball common draft to "the newspaper profession deciding
that a college journalism graduate could either work for the newspaper
in Anchorage, Alaska at the salary offered or not work at all."71 We
endorse the libertarian sentiments of this statement but disagree with
the implication that such restrictions are uncommon in the economy.
To take just one example, no electrician in Anchorage, Alaska, would
be so naive as to think he can go anywhere he pleases in the United
States to practice his trade. And if Congress is going to undo restric-
tions on employment, it should consider electricians as well as athletes.
71. 117 CONG. RmE. S15451 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1971).
